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The Trial Judge After Wards Cove: Shifting
Burdens, Shifting Rules
Judge David Doty*
I am here on a very dangerous mission. It is dangerous be-
cause what I want to do is share with you the way a judge makes a
decision within the constructs of what we know and what is de-
scribed as the law. I say this mission is dangerous because I run
the risk of demythologization. Certainly, a judge occupies a
mythological role in our society today; some people compare
judges to priests of long ago. I was struck by the fact that Joseph
Campbell, in his book The Power of Myth,' said, "When a judge
walks into the room everybody stands up. You're not standing up
to that guy, you're standing up to the robe he is wearing, and the
role that he is going to play." What makes him worthy of that re-
spect is the integrity of the principles of that role, and not some
group of prejudices of his own. What you are standing before is a
mythological character.
I do not want to mythologize what the judge does or what the
law is, but hopefully point it out to you. I will avoid the obvious
dangers-in light of many of the more popular demythologizations
that we have gone through here, for example, the championship
status of the Golden Gophers, or the Twins, or the Vikings, or the
purity of baseball. (I wish Bob Stein2 were here because he and I
have great arguments about the purity of baseball, the righteous-
ness of TV evangelists, and even democratic politicians.) I suppose
we have all been innoculated at this point, so I am not really in
great danger. After that whistling in the dark prologue, I am go-
ing to get to the point. My goal this afternoon is to illustrate three
points in the trial judge's decision-making process affected by the
decisions of the recent Supreme Court term. I understand that
you have all heard about these cases from Professor Sherry, that
you know what the holdings are, what they say, and what the im-
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1. Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth (1989).
2. Robert A. Stein, Dean, University of Minnesota Law School.
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portant parts of the decision are. (Sometimes the two are not the
same.) I am going to focus on one of those cases, Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio,3 to illustrate the point. But what I want to do
first is to show how the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove affect the decision-making process in general. Sec-
ond, I will discuss how the relationship between the common law
rules and the rules of civil procedure control the decision-making
process of a judge. And third, I will assess the practical effect of
this case on what lawyers and judges do. If time permits, I intend
to share with you a few thoughts on what I believe the trend is in
the Supreme Court, especially in the area of employment law, and
answer any questions you might have. Now let's look at Wards
Cove and examine how it clarifies, or changes, if you agree with
the dissent, the rules in a disparate impact Title V114 case. I am
sure that you know now that there are two general classifications
of Title VII cases. Disparate treatment means the individual must
show that she was treated differently from other individuals in
like circumstances and must prove the intent of the discriminator
in order to prevail. With disparate impact, the type of case in
Wards Cove, both the majority and dissenting Justices agree that
"racially neutral employment practices may be deemed violative of
Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to
discriminate." 5 That has historically been the difference between
the two types of cases, and it is still the difference between the two
kinds of cases.
So why all the fuss about this particular case? First, it held
that the circuit court mistakenly relied upon improper statistics in
finding that the employees had made out a prima facie case. The
real holding of Wards Cove hangs on the Court's fear that the
methods used by the circuit court and the district court might lead
to the approval of quotas. The majority stated that as long as
there are no barriers or practices deterring qualified non-whites
from applying for non-cannery positions, if the percentage of se-
lected applicants who are non-white is not significantly less than
the percentage of qualified applicants who are non-white, the em-
ployer's selection mechanism probably does not have a disparate
impact on minorities. That is the narrow holding of Wards Cove.
The dissent does not address that particular part of the opinion.
Although Justice Stevens does take on some other things, is no
real disagreement with that portion of the opinion.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
5. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119.
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The majority addressed two other challenges the employees
made to the court of appeals decision. The first challenge relates
to that of causation, wherein the Court makes it clearer that em-
ployees must identify the specific employment practice leading to
the disparate impact in order to establish a prima facie case-even
in a case using the subjective criteria. Now, I say clearer because
the Court cites Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust6 which was
the basis for the statement that an employee must now point out a
specific causative element. Most people who have studied these
cases in practice never expected that reading of disparate impact
standards-until Wards Cove-but they certainly were given a big
clue of what was going on in Watson. The Wards Cove Court, in
an opinion by Justice White, quoted Justice O'Connor in the Wat-
son case, saying:
We note that the plaintiffs' burden in establishing a prima fa-
cie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical
disparities in the employer's work force. The plaintiff must
begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged. Especially in cases where an employer combines
subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized
rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolat-
ing and identifying the specific employment practices that are
allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. 7
Now the rule is that if the employee proves a prima facie case of
disparate impact, then the employer must produce evidence for a
legitimate justification for the practices used to prove the cause of
disparate impact in order to escape liability. In its opinion, the ma-
jority cites Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
seemed a little odd to some of us because that rule relates to the
burden shifting going on when a presumption exists in a case-for
example, when there is a presumption of death. The majority uses
an analogy from the disparate treatment cases to support its argu-
ment, so if you had not gotten a clue earlier that there was going
to be some sort of unification going on between these kinds of
cases, you got it there. The Court is now combining disparate
treatment with disparate impact cases in the particular area of the
burden of proof.
What the Court did, obviously, was to emphasize that in these
cases, the employee now has to prove that there was a specific fac-
tor that caused a disparate impact. The analogy would be that dis-
parate treatment also emphasizes the fact that the employee's
ultimate burden of persuasion is to show that the employer's busi-
6. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
7. Id. at 2788.
1990]
Law and Inequality
ness justification, although brought forth by the employer on its
burden of production, protects the employer from liability.
It is this maintenance of the burden of persuasion with the
plaintiff that the dissent, and some students of the law believe
changes the procedural rules of a disparate impact case. If you
read the dissent, you will see that that is where it really takes off.
This burden shifting can be very important in deciding the out-
come of a case such as this. The employer, under the Wards Cove
rules, may now show that the business practices are justified be-
cause they advance in a significant way the legitimate employment
goals of the employer. To disprove this, of course, is going to be
very difficult.
If an employee cannot persuade the trier of fact that the busi-
ness necessity advanced by the employer is pretextual, according
to the majority, she still may prevail if she can show that "other
tests or selection devices without a similarly undesirable racial ef-
fect would also serve the employer's legitimate hiring interests."
This too is a very difficult burden of proof. The majority goes on
to warn that "the judiciary should proceed with care before man-
dating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff's alternate selec-
tion or hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit."s In other
words, the Court simply told those of us who are in the judging
business how we should go about analyzing the business advance-
ment defense to the charge that the employer's decision was based
on discriminatory factors and that any assertion to the contrary
was pretexual.
Let me summarize what the rules are. First, plaintiffs must
establish a prima facie case showing that they are discriminated
against by the application of a facially neutral employment prac-
tice of the employer. They must both specifically identify the
practice and prove its disparate impact. Second, the employer
must come forth with a business justification for the allegedly dis-
criminatory practice which passes a reasoned review of a "substan-
tial justification." Again, these are instructions to the judge on
how to analyze those particular facts. Third, the plaintiff must
prove that the business necessity defense is pretextual and bears
the burden of persuasion in that effort. It is here that the dissent
really attacked the majority with an analysis of past cases and tort
law relating to the burden of persuasion in an affirmative defense
situation. Obviously, the dissent believes that the business justifi-
cation is an affirmative defense and tried to argue that. In this
8. Ward Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
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case, the majority just skipped over that notion and obviously is
not treating it as an affirmative defense.
In addition to the rules set forth in cases such as Wards Cove,
the rules of civil procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
have had a great effect on what the courts' decision making is all
about. As a quick review, Rule 569 relates to summary judgment,
and Rule 56(c) says, "The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' 0 Rule
56(e) states in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading,
but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be en-
tered against the adverse party.""
Now, back when I was practicing law, that didn't mean a lot, and,
frankly, we never read those sentences as meaning much of any-
thing, but since the trilogy-the summary judgment trilogy of Cel-
otex,l2 Anderson, 13 and Matsushida14--those words mean a great
deal. It is clear from what the Supreme Court has told us that we
are going to apply the rules as they are read. The words will ap-
ply, and we must dispose of cases in that manner.
Where does all this lead? Well, the judicial process, after a
complaint has been filed, follows a general pattern. A pre-trial
conference is held in accordance with Rule 16,15 during which the
issues are discussed. The parties occasionally will meet and confer
for the first time concerning the case together with the judge; they
talk about the case and, frankly, find out where the case is going to
go, with the judge guiding them as to future activity. At that
meeting, they arrange a schedule for discovery, also setting forth
the schedule for motions, and so forth, and so on. With some im-
agination, you can determine that an employment case may have
very different contours if certain weaknesses or strengths are ex-
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
11. Fed. R. Civ, P. 56(e).
12. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
13. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
14. Matsushida Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986).
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
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posed at this conference, giving a chance for either of the parties to
work on each other or for the judge to express an informal opinion
about the matter, or to set up a schedule which might push or pull
the fact-gathering process in a particular way. Obviously, judges
have to be very careful to act without causing any unfairness to a
party.
The second general thing that happens in the decision-mak-
ing process is that discovery goes on as controlled by the judge--or
the magistrate in our court. That, of course, can have a substantial
effect on an employment case. In Wards Cove, the majority relies
on the fact that the discovery rules are going to allow a plaintiff to
discover all the facts she is going to need to show, for example,
that the employer's decision is not pretextual. But you can imag-
ine that with good advocates working, it is not all that easy, and
you have to be very aggressive.
The third, and probably the most important, part of the pro-
cess is when a dispositive motion, either a Rule 1216 motion on the
pleadings or a Rule 5617 motion, is made by one of the parties. It is
at that juncture that the rules or analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove really comes into play. Generally, if a com-
plaint is well-pleaded, a Title VII case is not disposed of by a mo-
tion on the pleadings. It has got to be a fairly bad pleading-and
sometimes we do get them with pro se plaintiffs-but that rarely
happens. But, when a Rule 12 motion is converted to a Rule 56
motion or a Rule 56 motion is brought directly, a different situa-
tion exists. If an employer challenges a Title VII plaintiff, the ana-
lytical rules of both Wards Cove and Rule 56 provide a severe
burden for a plaintiff to overcome. If the defendant directly at-
tacks either the plaintiff's claim of discrimination or provides evi-
dence of business necessity, the plaintiff is required to come forth
with designated facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion and show that the employer's business necessity defense is a
pretext at that stage of the pleadings because the ultimate burden
of persuasion has been shifted. The plaintiff must now show a
prima facie case of discrimination and disprove the business neces-
sity defense. The plaintiff must produce facts from which the
judge may conclude that no reasonable fact-finder, when looking
at the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, would conclude that the moving party would not ultimately
prevail. Of course, in a pure Title VII case, the judge deciding the
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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summary judgment motion is the judge who will ultimately decide
the facts in the action if it is tried, since there is no jury.
You all know that a defendant is not entitled to a summary
judgment unless the court concludes that there is not a genuine is-
sue as to any material fact. Under that standard, however, the
burden of proof remains on that party bearing the burden of proof
at trial-that comes out of the Anderson Liberty 18 case. Thus, the
importance of the burden-shifting holding of Wards Cove: the mo-
vant is not even initially required to support its motion with affida-
vits and other similar evidentiary materials. In a disparate impact
case where the non-moving plaintiff will bear the burden of proof,
the submission of any competent evidence compels the non-moving
party to go beyond the pleadings and submit its own evidentiary
materials demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue
for trial. The test for the existence of a genuine factual issue is
not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is
any evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a
verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the honest of proof
is imposed. That is the standard which the judge has to use in de-
ciding whether the summary judgment motion should be granted
or not. The test reflects the view that summary judgment is not to
be regarded as a disfavored procedural shortcut anymore but,
rather, as an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which
are designed to insure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action. You can see then why many disparate impact
cases can now be decided at the summary judgment stage when
previously few were decided at that point.
The practical effect of the interplay between the rules of pro-
cedure in a disparate impact case as set down in Wards Cove and
Rule 56 is to put a great burden on both the lawyers involved in
these cases and on the judge. The lawyers must develop their facts
early and succinctly, especially those lawyers representing plain-
tiffs. Plaintiffs' lawyers will be much more aggressive in discov-
ery, especially in an attempt to make clear the causative factors
leading to disparate impact in any potential business necessity jus-
tification. Plaintiffs will necessarily need to be aggressive in deter-
mining facts to prove that the business necessity is nothing but a
pretext and will necessarily be very imaginative coming up with
alternatives to the business necessity to show that it is not justifi-
able. Defendants' counsel, on the other hand, will obviously be
very aggressive in bringing Rule 12 or Rule 56 motions. That leads
to the most horrendous conclusion that judges will be faced with
18. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
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substantially more motions in these cases looking toward ultimate
disposition. Now as you can probably imagine, the work of a judge
and of law clerks is multiplied by a large factor when complicated
factual scenarios are presented to the judge for decision at an early
stage of the proceedings. Of course, as you probably already know,
although the Rule 56 analysis that I have gone over is very heavily
into factual analysis, we must look at the facts, digging them out of
whatever materials are given to us by the attorneys.
Jury trials are the usual salvation of an overworked bench.
But unless the law changes further to allow Title VII plaintiffs to
have a jury under federal law, such as ADA plaintiffs now have,
the holding in Wards Cove looks like really bad news for a federal
judge. In lieu of this dire prediction of more work for the judge, it
appears that some silver lining might be found in these otherwise
gloomy clouds. For reasons announced by the Chief Justice in var-
ious speeches in some of his opinions, it appears that the Rehn-
quist Court is attempting to rationalize the decisions of the Court
and, in most cases, to make the law more easily understood and
applied. For example, in Wards Cove, the law related to disparate
impact cases and disparate treatment cases aligned so that the
rules are easier for the parties and the courts that are trying to ap-
ply them to understand. It is very difficult sometimes to try to
wind your way through those things. Other examples of this ra-
tionalization effort can be adduced. For example, in the securities
arbitration area, the old doctrine of Wilko v. Swan 19 was over-
turned and supplanted by the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas 20 which
holds that such cases must now be arbitrated. It also is obvious
that the Rehnquist Court, at least in my view, will probably view
the political and legislative processes with more importance and
really eschew judicial intervention. Wards Cove can illustrate that
the Rehnquist Court will arguably be more careful and literal in
its reading of Congressional enactments than its predecessor. It
also appears that precedent will be revered by this Court, and that
no revolutionary doctrine is likely to be asserted, notwithstanding
the debate that Webster 21 and some of the other cases have gener-
ated. If you read Webster, Patterson, 22 and Wilkes, 23 it is clear
that precedent in the true sense is going to be adhered to. Regard-
19. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
20. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917
(1989).
21. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1988).
22. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
23. Wilkes v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, 109
S. Ct.'493 (1989).
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ing Wards Cove, a natural reading would have been that the Court
was going to overrule the Duke Power 24 but it took great pains to
not overrule Duke Power; it is still good law.
So, what is the meaning of all of this? As one Chief Justice
was quoted as telling his law clerk, "Well, I don't know really."
Personally, what I think it means is that the life of a lawyer and a
judge will remain extremely interesting, extremely challenging,
and, in other words, probably nothing new is happening.
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

